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        ith the contentious U.S. 2020 elections having concluded, it is a propi-
tious moment to examine the international law rules bearing on foreign in-
terference by cyber means in this fundamental expression of democracy. As 
in 2016, “President Putin and the Russian state authorized and conducted 
influence operations against the 2020 U.S. presidential election aimed at den-
igrating President Biden and the Democratic Party, supporting former Pres-
ident Trump, undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and 
exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US.”1  
Russia did not, however, attempt to “alter[ ] any technical aspect of the 
voting process, including voter registration, ballot casting, vote tabulation, 
or reporting results.”2 Instead, its “online influence actors sought to affect 
US public perceptions of the candidates, as well as advance Moscow’s 
longstanding goals of undermining confidence in US election processes and 
increasing sociopolitical divisions among the American people.”3 
But Russia was not alone. According to the U.S. intelligence community, 
“Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to un-
dercut former President Trump’s reelection prospects,” while “a range of 
additional foreign actors—including Lebanese Hizballah, Cuba, and Vene-
zuela—took some steps to influence the election.”4 Interestingly, China did 
not conduct operations designed to alter the outcome, although it did con-
sider doing so.5 Despite counterfactual claims to the contrary by Trump, 
however, the United States successfully conducted the 2020 election.6 
 
1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, FOREIGN THREATS TO THE 2020 US FED-
ERAL ELECTIONS 2 (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/as-
sessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf. 
2. Id. at 1. 
3. Id. at 3. 
4. Id. at i. 
5. Id. 
6. Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & 
the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees, CYBERSECURITY 
AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news/ 
2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-
election. The President fired Christopher Krebs, the Director of the Cybersecurity and In-
frastructure Security Agency, the agency that released the statement. David E. Sanger & 
Nicole Perlroth, Trump Fires Christopher Krebs, Official Who Disputed Election Fraud Claims, NEW 














While actual and potential interference in American elections has cap-
tured the most attention, the phenomenon is global. For instance, in an ami-
cus brief filed in federal court, former U.S. national security officials have 
asserted, 
 
Over the last several years, evidence has emerged that Moscow has 
launched an aggressive series of active measure campaigns to interfere in 
elections and destabilize politics in Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Estonia, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Poland 
and Hungary, to name just a few. They sought to inflame the issues of 
Catalonian independence and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom.7 
 
Even Russia has been victimized. In 2018, for example, a distributed denial 
of service attack was conducted against Russia’s Central Election Commis-
sion, allegedly from locations in fifteen countries.8  
Such election-related cyber operations have captured the international 
law community’s attention, as evidenced by the recent The Oxford Statement 
on International Law Protections Against Foreign Electoral Interference Through Digital 
Means, which 171 experts in the field signed.9 This article examines how in-
ternational law applies to election interference from three angles. Part II as-
 
7. Brief for Former National Security Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 8, Roy Cockum et al. v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. et al., No. 1:17-cv-
1370-ESH (Dist. Ct. D.C. Dec. 8, 2017). Interestingly, the U.S. Justice Department has in-
dicted six Russian GRU intelligence officers for, inter alia, attempted interference in the 2017 
French elections. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six Russian GRU Officers Charged 
in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive 
Actions in Cyberspace (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-
officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and.  
8. Russian Central Election Commission Comes Under Cyberattack, RT (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://www.rt.com/news/421622-russian-election-under-cyber-attack/. 
9. The Oxford Statement on International Law Protections Against Foreign Electoral 
Interference through Digital Means, https://elac.web.ox.ac.uk/the-oxford-statement-on-
international-law-protections-against-foreign-electoral-interference-through (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2021). See also The 9 Principles, PARIS CALL (Dec. 11, 2018), https://pariscall.inter-
national/en/principles (Principle 3 provides that States and others must “Strengthen our 
capacity to prevent malign interference by foreign actors aimed at undermining electoral 
processes through malicious cyber activities.”); Advancing Cyberstability: Final Report, GLOBAL 
COMMISSION ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE (Nov. 2019), https://cyberstability.or 
g/report/ (Proposed Norm 2 provides, “State and non-state actors must not pursue, sup-
port or allow cyber operations intended to disrupt the technical infrastructure essential to 











sesses if, and if so when, such interference by cyber means violates interna-
tional law, particularly the rules prohibiting violation of a State’s sovereignty 
or intervention in its internal affairs, or those requiring respect for interna-
tional human rights. In Part III, the discussion turns to the duties States 
shoulder to put an end to hostile cyber election interference pursuant to the 
principle of due diligence and the requirement to protect international hu-
man rights. The article concludes in Part IV with a brief survey of the re-
sponse options available under international law to States facing election 
meddling by cyber means.  
 
II. INTERFERENCE AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Election interference by foreign States rises to the level of an “internationally 
wrongful act” when two elements are present.10 First, the action or omission 
in question must be legally attributable to a State. Second, that act must breach 
an obligation owed in international law to the target State. I will first briefly 
examine the attribution element and then move on to the various substantive 
obligations that election interference is most likely to breach—the prohibi-
tion of intervention, the duty to respect the sovereignty of other States, and 




Attribution in the legal sense must be distinguished from attribution in the 
technical sense of the word, although the latter forms the factual predicate 
for the former. Legally, the concept of attribution denotes a situation in 
which an individual or group’s conduct is regarded as that of a State. The 
challenge is that there are many forms of relationship to a State. For instance, 
in 2020, “Russia’s intelligence services, Ukraine-linked individuals with ties 
to Russian intelligence and their networks, and Russian state media, trolls, 
and online proxies engaged in activities” targeting the U.S. elections.11  
 
10. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 
2), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf  [hereinafter Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility]. The Articles on State Responsibility are a restatement of the 
customary law of State responsibility that is considered generally, albeit not entirely, accurate 
by most States. 











The clearest basis for attributing a cyber operation that interferes with 
an election is when an organ of the State conducts it,12 as was the case with 
Russian intelligence agencies and their 2016 and 2020 U.S. election interfer-
ence and influence campaigns.13 An entity may qualify as an organ of the 
State either by being designated as such in the State’s law or operating in 
“complete dependence” on the State.14 The latter basis precludes the possi-
bility of a State escaping responsibility for election interference by using an 
organization that lacks de jure organ status under its domestic law, but that 
nevertheless engages in cyber activities for and at the State’s direction; in 
other words, acts as its de facto organ.15 
When non-State actors conduct cyber operations, the most likely basis 
for attribution is that they acted “on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of” of the State.16 This would appear to be the legal basis for attributing 
the Internet Research Agency’s 2016 operations to Russia.17 And, as noted, 
Russia turned to various forms of proxy actors in 2020. 
The terms instruction, direction, and control are somewhat ambiguous. 
Some cases are self-evident, as when there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the State and a private company, like a marketing agency or social 
media consultancy, that is conducting the election interference, on the one 
hand (attribution), or when “patriotic hackers” carry out the operations with-
out any State involvement, on the other (no attribution). Yet, in many cases, 
assessing whether the relationship between the non-State actor and the State 
amounts to instructions, direction, or control is not straightforward. This is 
not necessarily because of a lack of clarity in the attribution rules, but instead 
because of a dearth of evidence as to the nature of the relationship between 
the State and the non-State actor. 
 
12. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 10, art. 4; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS r. 15 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. 
ed., 2017).  
13. Guy Faulconbridge, What is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?, REUTERS, Oct. 
5, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-
gru-military-intelligence-agency-idUSKCN1MF1VK. 
14. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 392 (Feb. 
26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 109–10 (June 27). 
15. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, cmt. ¶ 11 to art. 4. 
16. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added); see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, r. 17. 
17. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Ex-
posing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements, 











Without attribution to a State, cyber election interference by non-State 
actors does not violate international law, although it may trigger positive ob-
ligations of prevention that are discussed below. But even when a cyber op-
eration is attributable to a State, the interference must breach an obligation 
owed to the State conducting the election before it qualifies as an interna-
tionally wrongful act. In that regard, the discussion first turns to the prohi-
bition of intervention.  
 
B. Prohibition of Intervention 
 
The international law rule that has drawn the most attention with respect to 
foreign cyber election interference is the prohibition of intervention into the 
internal or external affairs of other States. Appearing in such instruments as 
the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration,18 it is a well-accepted rule of cus-
tomary international law.19 Variants also appear in treaties such as the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States.20 However, caution is merited in 
applying the treaty rules because their parameters may differ from their cus-
tomary counterpart, which is the focus of the discussion below. The applica-
bility of the customary prohibition in the cyber context was confirmed in the 
2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) report that the General 
Assembly subsequently endorsed.21 No State opposed this position.22 
 
18. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
19. Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (updated Apr. 2008), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780 
199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434?rskey=sOnqwN&result=1&prd=OPIL. 
20. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 2(b), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
21. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), trans-
mitted by Letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014), ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts]; 
G.A. Res. 70/237 (Dec. 30, 2015) (endorsement). For an analysis of the rule in the cyber 
context, see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, cmt. to r. 66. 
22. See, e.g., statements by State officials on election interference by cyber means and 
intervention. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Finland, International Law and 
Cyberspace: Finland’s National Positions 3, https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/Kyber-
kannatPDF_EN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-07d5af3c6d85?t=1603097522727 (last 











As understood in customary law, intervention consists of two elements 
famously set forth by the International Court of Justice in its Paramilitary 
Activities judgment.23 Both must be satisfied before a breach exists. First, the 
cyber operation in question has to affect another State’s internal or external 
affairs, that is, its domaine réservé. Second, it must be coercive. States that have 
spoken to the issue are in accord with these constitutive elements. For in-
stance, the 2019 “International Law Supplement” to Australia’s International 
Cyber Engagement Strategy explains, paraphrasing the International Court of 
Justice in Paramilitary Activities, that a “prohibited intervention is one that in-
terferes by coercive means (in the sense that they effectively deprive another 
state of the ability to control, decide upon or govern matters of an inherently 
sovereign nature), either directly or indirectly, in matters that the principle of 
state sovereignty permits a state to decide freely.”24 
Within the domaine réservé, the area of activity international law leaves to 
regulation by States, States enjoy discretion to make their own choices. Elec-
 
Attorney General of Israel), Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the 
Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 395, 403 
(2021); Government of the Netherlands, Letter from  the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, 
app. at 3 (July 5, 2019), https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-docume 
nts/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace 
[hereinafter Netherlands, International Legal Order in Cyberspace]; Jeremy Wright, UK At-
torney General, Address at Chatham House: Cyber and International Law in the 21st Cen-
tury (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-
law-in-the-21st-century; Brian J. Egan, (Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State), International Law 
and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 175 (2017); 
Paul C. Ney, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command 
Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/ 
Speech/Article/2099378/dod-generalcounsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-confer-
ence/. 
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27). 
24. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL 
CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: 2019 INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT annex A 
(2019), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-
engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html [hereinaf-
ter SUPPLEMENT TO AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW TO STATE CONDUCT IN CYBERSPACE]. See also Ministry of the Armies, International 
Law Applied to Cyberspace § 1.1.1. (2019) (France), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/con-
tent/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cy-











tions represent a paradigmatic example of a matter encompassed in the do-
maine réservé. Indeed, the International Court of Justice cited “choice of po-
litical system” to illustrate the concept in its Paramilitary Activities judgment.25  
The increasing regulatory reach of international law is causing a growing 
number of State activities to fall outside the domaine réservé, as exemplified by 
the expansion of international human rights law. Today, certain election-re-
lated activities implicate rights like the freedom of expression, the right to 
privacy, and the right to vote (discussed below). Thus, for example, a foreign 
State providing secure online communications access to individuals whose 
right to political expression is impeded by their State during an election 
would not intrude into the latter’s domaine réservé. The operation might violate 
other obligations owed to the latter, but not the prohibition of intervention.  
While foreign election interference will usually manifestly transgress the 
victim State’s domaine réservé, application of the second element of prohibited 
intervention—coercion—is more complicated. It occupies center stage with 
respect to intervention, for, as the International Court of Justice explained 
in Paramilitary Activities, “the element of coercion . . . defines, and indeed 
forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.”26  
As Finland has astutely cautioned, “while the conduct of elections be-
longs undisputedly to the internal affairs of each State, all methods of elec-
toral interference do not display the element of coercion.”27 Coercive cyber 
operations have to be distinguished from those that are merely influential or 
persuasive. Noting the “precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthor-
ised intervention, has not yet fully crystallised in international law,” the Neth-
erlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has observed, “in essence it means com-
pelling a State to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission) that 
it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the intervention must 
be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.”28 The challenge is 
to identify the point at which permitted influence becomes prohibited coer-
cion. 
A helpful way to approach the issue is to distinguish election-related 
cyber activities that affect the State’s ability to conduct an election from those 
that target voter attitudes. Foreign cyber activities that deprive a State of its 
ability to act vis-à-vis the domaine réservé are almost always coercive. They 
make it objectively impossible or substantially more difficult for the State to 
 
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205. 
26. Id. 
27. Finland’s National Positions, supra note 22, at 3.  











pursue a particular policy or activity, as when a cyber operation interferes 
with either a State’s administration of an election or with the election infra-
structure itself. The obvious example would be using cyber means to cause 
a miscount, which would be coercive because the State’s actual choice, as 
reflected in the vote, is being repressed. Another State could do so by directly 
tampering with the vote count, disabling election machinery or causing it to 
malfunction, blocking e-voting, and the like.  
Foreign States can also indirectly disrupt a State’s ability to conduct an 
election by engaging in activities directed at voters, for example, by engineer-
ing voter suppression. Consider the use of social media to falsely report that 
a dangerous incident, like an active shooter situation, is ongoing near a voting 
location and warn people to stay out of the area. Reasonable individuals 
would follow those instructions and thus not cast their vote. Or a State could 
use social media to give improper instructions about voting in another State, 
such as the wrong location, or block or alter correct information as to where 
to vote. An example was the use of Twitter in English and Spanish during 
the 2016 elections to claim voters could cast their vote for Hillary Clinton 
through text messaging.29 Those who followed the instructions did not ac-
tually vote, for there is no voting via text message in the United States. 
Another example would be the circulation of false information online 
regarding how and when to request, complete, and mail-in, absentee ballots. 
Election returns even could be falsely reported before the polls closed, caus-
ing voters to conclude that because their preferred candidate has already ef-
fectively lost, there is no point in voting. In all of these cases, the target 
State’s ability to make free choices through its election has been coerced, 
regardless of whether it can conclusively be shown that the election’s out-
come was altered.  
Of course, a rule of reason must apply. Operations that result in only a 
minimal disruption of voting would not qualify as coercive. Other issues, like 
the timing of an operation or whether the State had an opportunity to thwart 
it, might also weigh in the assessment. But by and large, cyber operations 
intended to directly or indirectly affect a State’s ability to conduct an election 
by targeting either its administration of the election or the voters’ ability to 
cast a ballot are coercive. 
The more complex case is that of cyber activities intended to influence 
the electorate’s attitudes towards a particular candidate or issue on the ballot. 
 
29. Jeff John Roberts, Sneaky Ads on Twitter Tell Voters to Text Votes for Hillary Clinton, 











Although directed at voters, these information operations are being used to 
influence the State. While no definitive standard exists for assessing them 
against the requirement of coercion, the assessment is necessarily one of de-
gree.  
Arguably, it is reasonable to characterize as coercive those cyber opera-
tions that deprive the electorate, or a substantial number of individual voters, 
of information bearing on the election. After all, having access to reliable 
information about candidates or issues would seem essential to ensuring an 
election is meaningful. Examples might include denial of service attacks 
against a campaign’s social media presence or the targeting of media outlets 
that support a particular candidate.  
A more complicated situation arises when information regarding candi-
dates or issues is pushed to the electorate by a foreign State. Such operations 
raise critical questions of international law, for the greatest success in affect-
ing elections has been achieved “by influencing the way voters think, rather 
than tampering with actual vote tallies.”30  
Traditional messaging setting forth a State’s position on a foreign elec-
tion is not coercive. This conclusion is supported by widespread State prac-
tice. Such messaging influences and persuades, not coerces. The unsettled 
question is whether there is some point at which a foreign State’s infor-
mation campaign becomes coercive. Imagine, for instance, a foreign State 
investing sufficient resources in support of a candidate to overwhelm the 
opponent’s online advertising, thereby allowing the former to dominate the 
traditional and social media information space. As it stands, the law is not 
sufficiently clear about whether, and if so when, information operations can 
qualify as coercive.  
Nevertheless, it might be possible to agree on certain non-exhaustive 
factors that would likely influence a foreign information operation’s charac-
terization during an election as coercive or not. The operation’s “scale and 
effects” would appear to be highly relevant. There is precedent for looking 
to these factors in interpreting ill-defined thresholds. For example, the In-
ternational Court of Justice has pointed to scale and effects when assessing 
 
30. Luke Harding, Rigged: America, Russia and 100 Years of Covert Electoral Interference by 













whether a “use of force” rises to the level of an “armed attack,”31 and States 
are increasingly using the same approach with regard to the threshold for a 
cyber use of force.32 Scale and effects would consider factors such as how 
widespread the impact of the election interference is, how seriously it affects 
the election, and perhaps even the nature and significance of the election in 
question (e.g., municipal versus national). 
Another factor that might bear on determining whether an information 
campaign is coercive is the veracity of the information in question. At first 
glance, it would seem challenging to make the case that the release of truthful 
information can ever be coercive. After all, at least in theory, the better in-
formed the electorate, the more it can participate meaningfully.  
But consider the scenario offered above where a foreign State dominates 
the information space. Or recall the 2016 Russian meddling, in which genu-
ine but purloined material was released at a point in the election that did not 
allow the Clinton campaign time to react and recover effectively, thereby 
skewing voting. In that case, the fact that the truthful information was pack-
aged in a layer of deception about the identity of those who acquired it and 
their affiliation with Russia complicated matters. Had American voters 
known that the information, even if truthful, was being disseminated by Rus-
sia as part of an influence campaign, they might have weighed it differently. 
Perhaps there should be a presumption that the dissemination of truthful 
and complete information does not violate international law, but that pre-
sumption should be rebuttable in extreme cases. 
It would seem easier to describe disinformation campaigns as coercive.33 
The range of possible scenarios is limited only by one’s imagination. For 
instance, artificial intelligence could create fake user profiles (profile pics, 
 
31. Interpreting “use of force” under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and “armed at-
tack” under Article 51, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
32. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNA-
TIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, ANNEX A, AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE AP-
PLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO STATE CONDUCT IN CYBERSPACE 90, (2017), 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engage-
ment-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html. 
33. While misinformation is false information, disinformation is false information 
spread with the intent to deceive. Meira Gebel, Misinformation vs. Disinformation: What to Know 














names, etc.) in considerable numbers to create negative “buzz” about a can-
didate on social media. Or consider a deep fake in which a candidate pur-
portedly admits to egregious criminal behavior. Released just before election 
day, when there is no time to counteract its effect, it successfully sways the 
election result. Similarly, take a cyber operation involving a fake website mas-
querading as an influential media outlet that puts out a story as the polls open 
claiming the candidate has admitted to criminal activity. The story goes viral, 
and the candidate loses.  
Many other factors could play into determining whether a foreign infor-
mation campaign (including disinformation) during an election is fairly con-
sidered coercive. For instance, an operation designed to achieve a specific 
result, such as the election of a particular candidate favored by the foreign 
State, is probably more likely to be characterized as coercive than one in-
tended merely to cause general electoral disruption, for instance by using 
social media to disseminate disinformation about all the key candidates. Sim-
ilarly, an operation that exploits specific vulnerabilities in the target State, 
such as ethnic or religious division, presumably would be more prone to 
being seen as coercive than one that is merely negative.  
 
C. Obligation to Respect Sovereignty 
 
Foreign activities in cyberspace can also violate the rule of sovereignty. Be-
fore discussing how, it must be cautioned that one State, the United King-
dom, has rejected the proposition that cyber operations can amount to a 
violation of sovereignty, relying instead on the rule of intervention to serve 
as the bulwark against, inter alia, foreign election interference.34 However, the 
stance, which has been discussed in depth elsewhere,35 has not been adopted 
by any other State. On the contrary, a growing number, including Finland,36 
 
34. Wright, supra note 22. 
35. Compare Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 207 (2017) (suggesting that sovereignty is 
not a primary rule of international law), with Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in 
Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UN-
BOUND 213 (2017) (arguing that actions reaching a threshold degree of infringement on the 
territorial integrity of another State, as well as those which constitute an interference with 
or usurpation of inherently governmental functions, violate the rule of sovereignty). See also 
Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 
1639 (2017). 











France,37 the Netherlands,38 Germany,39 Iran,40 the Czech Republic, Austria, 
and Switzerland,41 have taken the opposite position. Seemingly, so has 
NATO (with the UK reserving).42 It is the better view, for as Finland has 
warned,  
 
The argument has been raised recently that no legal consequences could be 
attached to sovereignty as a general principle, at least for the purposes of 
cyber activities. It is not only difficult to reconcile such an idea with the 
established status of the rule prohibiting violations of sovereignty in inter-
national law, but it also gives rise to policy concerns. Agreeing that a hostile 
cyber operation below the threshold of prohibited intervention cannot 
amount to an internationally wrongful act would leave such operations un-
regulated and deprive the target State of an important opportunity to claim 
its rights.43 
 
The analysis that follows proceeds on the basis that the requirement to re-
spect the sovereignty of other States is a primary rule of international law.44 
Max Huber famously set forth the classic definition of sovereignty in the 
1928 Island of Palmas arbitration: “Sovereignty in the relations between States 
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is 
the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions 
 
37. France, International Law Applied to Cyberspace, Ministry of the Armies, supra 
note 24, § 1.1.1. 
38. Netherlands, International Legal Order in Cyberspace, supra note 22, at 1–3. 
39. Norbert Riedel, Commissioner for International Cyber Policy, Germany, Address 
at Chatham House: Cyber Security as a Dimension of Security Policy (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150518-ca-b-chatham-house/27 
1832. 
40. General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Declaration 
Regarding International Law Applicable to the Cyberspace (July 2020), reprinted in 
NOURNEWS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://nournews.ir/En/News/53144/General-Staff-of-Ira-
nian-Armed-Forces-Warns-of-Tough-Reaction-to-Any-Cyber-Threat. 
41. Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security - Second Substantive Session, 
UN WEB TV (Feb. 10–14, 2020), videos of sessions available at http://webtv.un.org/. 
42. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION-3.20: 
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS, at v (2020), https://assets.pub-
lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89967 
8/doctrine_nato_cyberspace_operations_ajp_3_20_1_.pdf. 
43. Finland’s National Positions, supra note 22, at 3. 











of a State.”45 This formulation contains within it both instances of how sov-
ereignty can be violated.  
First, sovereignty can be violated based on an infringement of territorial in-
tegrity and inviolability.46 There is general agreement that a cyber operation 
causing physical damage or injury in another State qualifies as a violation of 
its sovereignty. Consensus also appears to have coalesced around treating a 
relatively permanent loss of cyberinfrastructure functionality as the requisite 
damage.47 While physical damage is unlikely in the election interference con-
text, prior to the 2020 federal election, the U.S. government warned that 
foreign governments might try to compromise election infrastructure (func-
tionality) in the 2020 elections.48 This raises the question of whether such 
operations would have violated U.S. sovereignty.  
Unfortunately, there is no such consensus as to a loss of functionality 
that is temporary or that causes the affected cyberinfrastructure to operate 
in a manner other than intended, as in making it run slowly or generate spu-
rious results. This is problematic because such consequences can be ex-
pected of election-related cyber operations; a real-world example is the denial 
of service attacks targeting Ukraine in 2014.49 France, which has been tar-
geted during elections,50 has addressed hostile cyber operations generating 
consequences of this nature in its legal doctrine. In 2018, the Ministry of the 
Armies noted that it would treat “any cyberattack against French digital sys-
 
45. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
46. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, cmt. ¶¶ 11–14 to r. 4. 
47. See, e.g., Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 41 (Czech Republic); France, In-
ternational Law Applied to Cyberspace, supra note 24, § 1.1.1. 
48. Press Release, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement by NCSC 
Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the American Public (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc 
-director-william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public. 
49. In 2014, CyberBerkut, a group of Russian hacktivists, targeted the Ukrainian Central 
Election Commission, bringing its network down for twenty hours and nearly leading to the 
announcement of a false winner. Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided “Wanton 
Destruction” from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 17, 2014), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-
avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers. 
50. In 2017, the GRU (Russian military intelligence) purportedly conducted operations 
directed at Emmanuel Macron’s campaign for the French presidency. Eric Auchard, Macron 













tems or any effects produced on French territory by digital means” attribut-
able to a State as a breach of France’s sovereignty.51 While the precise pa-
rameters of the functionality standard are indistinct, France presumably 
would treat a cyber operation targeting its government election hard-
ware/software or that causes “effects” on other systems, such as a denial of 
service operation directed at a campaign’s website, as a breach of French 
sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether other States will be willing to go 
as far in interpreting the territorial aspect of the sovereignty rule.  
Second, cyber activities that interfere with, or usurp, an “inherently governmental 
function” of the target State can violate its sovereignty.52 The issue in the elec-
tion context is interference. An inherently governmental function is one that 
only States may perform (or authorize non-State entities to carry out); 
plainly, conducting elections qualifies. There is no requirement that the in-
terference be coercive, as is the case with intervention—any interference 
with the State’s ability to perform the function in question suffices. And un-
like the violation of sovereignty based on territoriality, there is no require-
ment of any particular physical or functional effects. The only necessary con-
sequence is interference itself. 
It is not clear whether the rule encompasses all interference with an elec-
tion. Of course, a foreign State’s cyber activity that directly diminishes the 
government’s ability to conduct the election violates that State’s sovereignty 
on this basis.53 Examples include temporarily disrupting election hardware 
and software’s proper functioning, blocking access to online government in-
formation about the election, and altering that information.  
It is somewhat unsettled whether cyber activities that are not directed 
against the government’s election systems can violate sovereignty. It would 
seem reasonable that those that indirectly disrupt the election’s smooth exe-
cution, such as voter suppression activities, would qualify.54 For example, 
posting incorrect information about how, where, or when to vote reasonably 
could be characterized as interfering with the State’s ability to conduct the 
election.  
 
51. France, International Law Applied to Cyberspace, supra note 24, § 1.1.1. 
52. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, cmt. ¶¶ 15–20 to r. 4. 
53. See, e.g., the Oxford Statement’s reference to “Interfering, by digital or other means, 
with electoral processes with respect to balloting or verifying the results of an election.” 
Oxford Statement on International Law Protections, supra note 9, r. 2a. 
54. See, e.g., the Oxford Statement’s reference to “Conducting cyber operations that 
adversely impact the electorate’s ability to participate in electoral processes, to obtain public, 
accurate and timely information thereon, or that undermine public confidence in the integ-











The open question is whether cyber activities involving information or 
disinformation that does not affect how the election is carried out ever vio-
late sovereignty. Consider, for instance, operations designed to foster socie-
tal division, as in using “dog whistles” to exploit racial fault lines.55 If such 
operations are causally related to the requisite consequences (e.g., by inciting 
riots that cause damage or injury), a violation of the rule might be made out, 
but even this remains uncertain. 
 
D. Obligation to Respect Human Rights  
 
There is widespread consensus that human rights must be respected and 
protected online as they are offline.56 Several specific rights loom large in the 
online election interference context—the freedom of expression; the right 
to privacy; the right to participate in public affairs, vote, and stand for elec-
tion; and the right of all peoples to self-determination. However, the applica-
bility of human rights to cyber election interference operations may be ques-
tioned on the ground of extraterritoriality, a much-contested issue in various 
other contexts. Each of these points will be addressed in turn. 
Both treaty and customary international law guarantee freedom of expres-
sion. It is enshrined in such instruments as the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),57 the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,58 and regional treaties like the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).59 As described in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, it encom-
passes the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice.” States that interfere with 
 
55. Ian Olasov, Offensive Political Dog Whistles, VOX (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.vox. 
com/the-big-idea/2016/11/7/13549154/dog-whistles-campaign-racism. 
56. See, e.g., 2015 Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts, supra note 21, ¶ 28; 
Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/8 (July 16, 2012); Human 
Rights Council Res. 26/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/13 (June 26, 2014); Human Rights 
Council Res. A/HRC/RES/32/13 (July 18, 2016); Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/ 
RES/38/7 (July 17, 2018); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, rr. 34–38; Oxford State-
ment on International Law Protections, supra note 9, r. 2c. 
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
58. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
59. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 











elections abroad implicate the freedom of expression when they, for in-
stance, obstruct candidates’ online campaigns (impart) or alter or erase 
online information about candidates that voters wish to access (seek).  
Like the right to freedom of expression, the right to privacy is a customary 
right that also finds expression in treaty law.60 It, too, can be implicated by 
election interference, as was well illustrated by the exfiltration and public 
dissemination of private email during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.61  
Both treaties and customary law also guarantee all citizens the right to 
participate in public affairs, vote in elections, and stand for election.62 While interna-
tional case law has historically focused on internal interference with these 
rights, there is no reason in principle to exclude interference by third States 
from their scope (on the extraterritoriality point, see below). Thus, for ex-
ample, cyber operations resulting in voter suppression would directly impede 
enjoyment of the right to vote. As for influence operations, the UN Human 
Rights Committee has noted that “voters should be able to form opinions 
independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, induce-
ment or manipulative interference of any kind.”63  
None of the aforementioned individual rights are absolute. States may 
limit their exercise or enjoyment by measures that pursue a legitimate aim, 
are necessary to achieve that aim, are prescribed by law, and are proportion-
ate.64 However, it is improbable that a foreign State’s electoral interference 
could satisfy these requirements, if only because it would not be pursuing an 
aim regarded as legitimate under human rights law. It is much more likely 
that the victim State would act to counter foreign online election interfer-
ence. If it does, any activity that impedes access to online expression, such 
as requiring internet service providers or social media companies to filter, 
 
60. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 17; UDHR, supra note 58, art. 12; ECHR, supra 
note 59, art. 8. 
61. 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www. 
cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html. 
62. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 25; UDHR, supra note 58, art. 21; Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 
20, 1952, C.E.T.S. 009; American Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.   
63. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in 
Public Affairs, Voting and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996). 
64. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011); TALLINN 











delete, or label data posted or transmitted by the interfering State, must itself 
be justifiable under the criteria mentioned above. 
It has been suggested that the human right to self-determination, which 
again is protected by both customary and treaty law,65 might be implicated 
by foreign election interference.66 Self-determination includes the right of a 
people to determine their own political arrangements. Those taking the po-
sition that the issue of self-determination surfaces in the context of foreign 
election interference do so on the basis that elections represent the sovereign 
will of a people concerning the nature of their governing political system 
and, therefore, disrupting them interferes with their exercise of self-determi-
nation.  
The argument is facially plausible, but this interpretation of the right pre-
sents numerous challenges. Self-determination is a collective, not individual, 
right, which raises issues as to its enforcement; the right typically applies in 
the context of a State’s emergence; there are practical difficulties in deter-
mining that the interference blocked the will of the people; and it is unclear 
whether the concept of a “people” in international law, which is already un-
settled, can refer to the entire population of an established State or only to a 
sub-group. Nevertheless, this is an interesting proposition that could gain 
traction in the face of chronic foreign election interference by cyber means, 
especially when such interference is systematic and large-scale. 
Whether any of these human rights apply to foreign cyber election inter-
ference depends on the contentious issue of extraterritoriality, that is, whether 
States owe human rights obligations to those in the territory of another 
State.67 After all, a foreign State’s election interference operations are extra-
territorial by definition. Of course, in the case of specific treaty obligations, 
the answer is found by interpreting the instrument’s jurisdictional provisions. 
The discussion that follows, however, takes on the issue in a general sense. 
Restrictive views on the matter hold that human rights do not apply ex-
traterritorially. The United States, for example, has long taken this position 
vis-à-vis the ICCPR68 (but see a 2010 U.S. State Department Legal Adviser 
 
65. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, art 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55. 
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Law?, 95 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1579, 1595–98 (2017). 
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68. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Report annex I, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ 











memorandum69). The European Court of Human Rights adopted a some-
what less restrictive (but still restrictive) position regarding the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Bankovic case, which involved the right 
to life.70 By such restrictive approaches, even if cyber election interference 
theoretically implicates human rights such as the freedom of expression or 
the right to privacy, it would not violate the human rights of those affected 
because the relevant human rights rule would not apply in the first place. 
The various opposing views argue that human rights law governs extra-
territorial cyber operations. Under one, the negative obligation to respect 
human rights (i.e., to refrain from conduct) simply should be understood to 
apply extraterritorially. By a second, termed the “functional approach,” con-
trol over the exercise or enjoyment of rights provides a basis for their applica-
tion.71 For instance, concerning the right to life, the Human Rights Commit-
tee has interpreted State jurisdiction under the ICCPR as reaching “all per-
sons over whose enjoyment of the right to life [the State] exercises power or 
effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory effec-
tively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by 
its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable man-
ner.”72 
The same logic could be applied to rights such as the freedom of expres-
sion or privacy that are implicated by foreign election interference, as the 
remotely conducted election interference may impact them as described 
above. Indeed, three distinguished officials have recently asserted, “the right 
to freedom of expression, which includes the right to seek, receive and im-
part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any 
 
69. Legal Adviser (Harold Koh), U.S. Department of State, Memorandum Opinion on 
the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oct. 19, 
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71. For a discussion of both views, see Marko Milanovic, Surveillance and Cyber Operations, 
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media, applies to everyone, everywhere.”73 In this regard, as the Human 
Rights Committee has opined, it would seem “unconscionable” to interpret 
human rights law to permit a State to violate human rights on the territory 
of another State in a manner that it “could not perpetrate on its own terri-
tory.”74  
 
III. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 
As should be clear, certain election-related cyber operations by foreign States 
will directly violate primary rules of international law, like sovereignty, inter-
vention, and human rights obligations. These are negative obligations. That is, 
they prohibit States from engaging in particular conduct. However, States 
sometimes shoulder positive obligations to act in the face of hostile cyber op-
erations. Two loom large, the obligation of due diligence under general in-
ternational law and the duty to protect human rights.  
 
A. Obligation of Due Diligence 
 
The International Court of Justice acknowledged a so-called “due diligence” 
obligation of States to control activities occurring on their territories in its 
first case, Corfu Channel.75 In its 1949 judgment, the Court observed that a 
State must not “allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to 
the rights of other states.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts concluded that 
there was no reason to exclude the rule’s application in the cyber context;76 
 
73. David Kaye, Harlem Désir & Edison Lanza, COVID-19: Governments Must Promote 
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a number of States have come to the same conclusion.77 However, unable to 
achieve unanimity on its status as a binding rule of international law in the 
cyber context, the UN Group of Governmental Experts treated due dili-
gence as (at the least) a so-called “voluntary, non-binding norm of responsi-
ble State behaviour” in its 2013 and 2015 reports.78  
Accordingly, whether a State must, as a matter of international law, take 
action to stop election interference by third States or non-State actors con-
ducted from, or by otherwise using (as in the case of hosting leaked data on 
a server in a third State or taking remote control of cyberinfrastructure from 
which to mount hostile operations), its territory remains unsettled. Even if 
so, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts cautioned that the due diligence obligation 
is quite limited in reach.79 Although the rule applies to both State and non-
State actors’ hostile cyber operations, the obligation only attaches when the 
operations are ongoing or imminent (in the sense of a material step having 
been taken). Additionally, they must affect an international legal right of the 
State concerned, cause “serious adverse consequences,” and the territorial 
State has to know of the operations in question. In these circumstances, the 
territorial State will still only be in breach of the obligation if it was feasible 
to end the operations and it did not do so.80 Importantly, there is no obliga-
tion to look to other States, including the victim State, for assistance, alt-
hough the territorial State is free to do so. 
 
77. See, e.g., Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia, Opening Address at CyCon 2019 
(May 29, 2019), https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of 
-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html; Finland’s National Positions, supra 
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Netherlands, International Legal Order in Cyberspace, supra note 22, at 4–5; Open-ended 
Working Group, supra note 41 (Brazil, Korea). The Oxford Statement treats due diligence 
as a binding rule of international law. Oxford Statement on International Law Protections, 
supra note 9, r. 4a. But see Open-ended Working Group, supra note 41 (Argentina); Schön-
dorf, supra note 22, at 404 (Israel).  
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¶ 13(c). 
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These limitations loom large in an election interference scenario. Most 
significantly, remotely conducted election interference from or through the 
territorial State would have to implicate a legal right of the victim State. The 
myriad fault lines outlined above in the relevant negative obligations would 
directly affect whether the due diligence rule applies in a particular situation. 
For instance, a State claiming a due diligence breach on the basis that the 
election interference implicates the rule of non-intervention would face the 
uncertainty surrounding the threshold for coercion. 
However, there is one significant benefit of looking to the rule of due 
diligence in cases of election interference. In a situation in which a State can-
not adequately attribute remote election interference in fact or law to the 
State from whose territory it is being conducted, the former may neverthe-
less be able to claim a breach of due diligence on the part of the latter. The 
territorial State’s failure to stop the election interference would open the 
door to countermeasures (see below) that could take the form of cyber op-
erations directed against the source of the interference.81  
 
B. Obligation to Protect Human Rights  
 
In addition to the duty to respect human rights, States shoulder an obligation 
to protect (secure, ensure) the human rights of individuals on their territory, a 
principle captured in the ICCPR82 and other human rights instruments, like 
the ECHR.83 As explained by the Human Rights Committee,  
 
the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will 
only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just 
against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts 
 
To discharge [the obligation of due diligence], states may, to the extent feasible, be required 
to, inter alia, investigate, prosecute or sanction those responsible, take measures to prevent 
or thwart operations spreading misleading or inaccurate information, and/or assist and co-
operate with other states in preventing, ending, or mitigating the adverse consequences of 
foreign cyber operations affecting electoral processes. 
 
Oxford Statement on International Law Protections, supra note 9. Although this is a worthy 
aspirational norm, international law has not developed to the point of requiring preventive 
obligations of due diligence in the cyber context. 
81. For an explanation of this dynamic, see Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Dili-
gence, 124 YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM 68, 79–80 (2015). 
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committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment 
of Covenant rights.84  
 
Thus, if harmful cyber interference by another State or a non-State actor is 
likely to impede, or is impeding, the exercise of protected rights related to 
the election, the State in which the election is taking place must take those 
measures at its disposal to prevent or end the interference.85  
It must be emphasized that unlike the due diligence obligation under 
general international law, which only applies to ongoing or imminent activi-
ties, the human rights obligation to protect requires a State to take reasonable 
preventive measures in anticipation of remotely conducted election interfer-
ence that would place protected rights at risk. Moreover, the protective ob-
ligation undoubtedly applies because the inability to exercise or enjoy the 
right in question occurs on the territory of the State conducting the election. 
However, it is unclear whether the protective obligation would extend to 
individuals located outside the State’s territory, such that State A would have 
a human rights duty to protect elections in State B if A’s territory was being 
used to mount cyber operations against B.  
Like due diligence under general international law, the obligation is a duty 
of conduct, not of result. States need only take those actions within their 
capabilities in the attendant circumstances. Factors bearing on feasibility 
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IV. RESPONSE OPTIONS 
 
States facing remotely conducted foreign cyber election interference have a 
number of response options at their disposal. Internally, they may take vari-
ous measures under their domestic law to protect election integrity. Such 
actions, which may, for example, involve the regulation of social media plat-
forms and restrictions on speech that contains electoral disinformation, have 
to comply with the requirements of international human rights law men-
tioned above. These are regulatory questions of great complexity that will 
not be addressed here further. 
Internationally, States may bring the matter before various dispute reso-
lution fora, such as the International Court of Justice or the European Court 
of Human Rights, or before political bodies like the UN Security Council. 
The Council could even authorize measures under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter to terminate the operations should it find the election interference 
to constitute a “threat to the peace.”86 However, several self-help measures 
are also available under international law to victim States.  
The option chosen by the United States when targeted by the Russian 
election interference in 2016 was retorsion.87 Retorsion is an act that, albeit 
unfriendly, does not violate international law.88 For instance, the Obama ad-
ministration imposed sanctions, expelled “diplomatic” personnel, and closed 
Russian facilities in response to Russia’s election meddling. Because retor-
sion involves acts that international law does not prohibit, a State may engage 
in it without establishing that the underlying activities violate its international 
legal rights. This may be why the Obama administration elected that course 
of action.  
If the remotely conducted election interference violates international 
law, the “injured State” may also take countermeasures.89 The difference be-
tween retorsion and a countermeasure is that the latter is an act (action or 
omission) that would be unlawful but for the fact that the injured State con-
ducts it to compel the offending State (“responsible State”) to desist and/or 
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to secure any reparations that might be due for any harm suffered.90 For 
reasons such as the risk of escalation, some nervousness surrounds the po-
litical endorsement of countermeasures’ applicability in the cyber context. 
Nevertheless, many States have explicitly confirmed their availability in re-
sponse to unlawful cyber operations.91  
In this regard, countermeasures are typically thought of as “hack backs.” 
For instance, an injured State may conduct cyber operations to disable the 
responsible State’s cyberinfrastructure used to perform the election interfer-
ence, an act that otherwise might amount to a breach of the responsible 
State’s sovereignty. However, the injured State may also direct countermeas-
ures at cyberinfrastructure other than that involved in the hostile operation;92 
indeed, the countermeasure need not even be cyber in nature, so long as it is 
designed to put an end to the unlawful cyber activity affecting the election 
or to secure reparations for harm suffered.93  
It must be emphasized that countermeasures are subject to multiple con-
ditions and limitations, such as a requirement of proportionality.94 Perhaps 
most significantly, they are only available in response to election interference 
that violates international law (including a failure to exercise due diligence). 
If either the element of attribution or breach is missing, a response cannot 
qualify as a countermeasure. The victim State, therefore, would be limited to 
responding with acts of retorsion.  
Finally, a State facing a “grave and imminent peril” to one of its “essen-
tial interests,” irrespective of the source and regardless of whether the peril 
is the result of an international law violation, may take otherwise unlawful 
action to put an end to the threat so long as the measures it takes are the 
only means of doing so and do not affect the essential interests of any other 
 
90. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 49. 
91. See, e.g., SUPPLEMENT TO AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE APPLICATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW TO STATE CONDUCT IN CYBERSPACE annex A, supra note 24; Kaljulaid, 
supra note 77 (Estonia); France, International Law Applied to Cyberspace, supra note 24, § 
1.1; Schöndorf, supra note 22, at 405 (Israel); Netherlands, International Legal Order in Cy-
berspace, supra note 22, at 7–8; Wright, supra note 22 (UK); U.S. Department of State, Oc-
tober 2014 U.S. Submission to GGE, Applicability of International Law to Conflicts in 
Cyberspace, 2014 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, 
§A(3), at 13, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/244486.pdf. 
92. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, cmt. ¶ 6 to r. 20. 
93. Id. cmt. ¶ 1 to r. 21. 











State.95 This so-called “plea of necessity” is a measure limited to exceptional 
circumstances.96  
The conduct of elections is undoubtedly an essential interest in a democ-
racy. Therefore, the determinative question concerning a particular instance 
of election interference will usually be whether the consequences are severe 
enough to merit characterization as “grave.” Unfortunately, international law 
provides no bright-line threshold for the requisite gravity. But if the peril is 
grave, an otherwise unlawful cyber response to the election interference is 
permissible as long as it is the only viable option to terminate the interfer-
ence.  
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
It’s complicated. Some foreign election-related activities are obviously un-
lawful, as when State organs conduct cyber operations that affect the target 
State’s ability to carry out the election. Beyond the few unequivocally wrong-
ful cases, multiple fault lines in the international law governing cyber activi-
ties could hinder definitive characterization of particular election interfer-
ence as unlawful. These range from questions of fact and evidence to unset-
tled issues surrounding the existence and interpretation of international law’s 
primary rules. Such problems bleed over into the availability of response op-
tions. The reality of this “fog of law” demands continued action by States to 
clarify the rules.97 Until that occurs, States will struggle to determine how to 
characterize election interference and respond effectively to it. 
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